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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
SARBANES-OXLEY AND ITS PROGENY
Robert E. Freer,Jr.
Raymond W Burroughs
INTRODUCTION
The magnitude of the market dollar impact, along with the
number of investors and employees affected by the corporate
accounting malfeasance of Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations,
announced in late 2001 and early 2002, drove the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (SOX) to swift implementation.' Experts deemed the apparent
concurrence in accounting issues and lack of detection by the auditors
2
to have contributed to the accounting malfeasance problems at Enron.
The resulting congressional hearings and investigation led to the
passage of SOX and the demise of Arthur Andersen LLP, the largest of

This swift
the "Big 5" accounting firms at the beginning of 2002.
enactment of SOX failed to anticipate the impact it would have on the
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1 See Paul Lowengrub, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Companies,
Investors & Financial Markets, SARBANES-OXLEY COMPLIANCE J. (Dec. 6,
http://www.sPM),
12:00
2005,
ox.com/dsp getFeaturesDetails.cfm?CID=1 141.
2 Louis Lavelle, Commentary: How Governance Rules Failed at Enron,
BLOOMBERG Bus. WK. (Jan. 21, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/02_03/b3766045.htm.

See, i.e., Corporate Accountability: Hearing Before the House of Rep.,
107th Cong. 1470-72 (2002) (statement of Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. State Att'y
Gen.).
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day-to-day practices of American businesses, including accounting
firms, as well as how it would impact foreign businesses trading, or
contemplating trading, in the U.S. 4
Congress, the SEC, and the President created the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act as a quick fix to help stimulate the economy by attempting to
rebuild consumer confidence. 5 Overall, Sarbanes-Oxley promoted
diligence, integrity, and honesty, which was needed to restore
consumer confidence in the cynical business climate caused by the
Enron and WorldCom scandals. If Congress had stopped with Title I
and Title II, on auditor independence and oversight, it would have been
sufficient to create the level of discipline and accountability within the
financial reporting system to correct the abuses. Regrettably, in Titles
III and IV, where SOX addresses "Corporate Responsibility" and
"Enhanced Financial Disclosure," the legislature has gone too far.
Titles III and IV enhance the powers of the audit committee, increase
disclosure requirements, and impose criminal liability on board
members who report inaccurately. 6 Ultimately, this legislative stew has
undermined protection for faithful actions of board members.
More specifically, Section 302 requires the principal executive
officers and the principal financial officers of public companies to
attest that the periodic reports filed by the company do not contain
misleading statements or omissions of material fact.8 Furthermore, the
officers must certify that they are responsible for establishing and
maintaining internal controls, which are designed to ensure the reports
accurately present the financial condition of the company; evaluating
the effectiveness of these internal controls; and presenting their
conclusions regarding these internal controls or any changes made

4 The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Fin. Services, 1 0 9 th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Hon. Michael G. Oxley,

at
available
Services),
Fin.
on
Comm.
Chairman,
http://financialservices.house.gov/medialpdf/ 109-21 .pdf ("[t]he costs of Section
404 are much higher than expected. That is a cause for concern, and I am
particularly sensitive to any undue burden on small and mid-size companies
whose compliance costs are a higher percentage of total revenues.").
s Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of
SOX 404, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 703, 705 (2007).
6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745,
775-791 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7201 (2002)).
Christopher Whalen, Revisiting Sarbanes-Oxley, INT'L EcoN., Fall 2003, at
40-43, available at http://www.intemational-economy.com/ TIE F03_Whalen.pdf#
search=/22Sarbanes-Oxley%/o2C/o20Prudent%/o2OMan%2ORule%22.
8 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, 116 Stat. at 777-78.
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thereto. 9 Section 906 encourages officers to take seriously the
certification of the periodic reports by imposing criminal penalties of
up to $1 million and ten years imprisonment on officers who certify
misleading financial statements.' 0 If such officers knowingly certify a
non-conforming statement, the penalties are expanded to up to $5
million and twenty years in prison."
The third and most controversial of the provisions is Section 404,
Management Assessment of Internal Controls.1 2 Since its passage, the
additional administrative costs of compliance have strained valuable
resources of American businesses and resulted in a corporate culture of
red tape and suspicion that has placed U.S. businesses at a significant
competitive disadvantage.13 SOX has adversely impacted America's
competitive position by substantially increasing non-productive
overhead while discouraging foreign firms and fast-growing firms in
the United States from listing on U.S. exchanges.14
Evidence shows that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has created
more burdens than aid. Although it has instilled consumer confidence,
the Act has caused publicly-traded companies and the U.S. market to
become substantially more unattractive. Publicly-registered companies
subject to the regulations of the SEC are too restricted to expand, grow,
and compete with companies listed in foreign markets. Corporate
officers cannot perform their duties properly, and consumers cannot
Foreign
expect to receive full performance from companies.
companies who once dreamed of registering on the U.S. exchanges
have suddenly opted for more attractive and less-restrictive markets.

"o

Sarbanes-Oxley Act §906, 116 Stat. at 806.

" Id.
12 See Prentice,supra note 5, at
705.
13 See Tamara Loomis, Sarbanes-Oxley Burdens Small Companies,
228(117) N.Y. L.J. 1 (Dec. 19, 2002).
14 SarbOx Has Foreign Companies Decamping, CIOINSIGHT (Mar. 5,

http://www.cioinsight.com/c/a/Past-News/SarbOx-Has-Foreign2005),
Companies-Decamping/ (quoting Rhian Chilcott, Confederation of British
Industry, who explained that the real problem for the U.S. economy is not just
the number of companies delisting, but "the companies that would have listed,
but now won't. Across the board, people are reconsidering.").
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I. STATUTORY HISTORY

Corporate fraud has played a material role in the industrial
history of the United States.15 For example, "financial genius Jay
Cooke, who masterminded a new strategy for selling government debt
during the Civil War, and Samuel Insull, who built a vast utilities
empire only to be ruined by the Depression."' 6 There are only a few
differences from past and present corporate scandals: higher stakes and
the sums of money have become increasingly more difficult to hide
from more informed regulatory officials as well as stockholders.
Unfortunately, two of the most notorious corporations, Enron and MCI
WorldCom, embraced illegality and scandal with open arms in the 21st
century, ruining the lives of employees, investors, and directors. While
Enron and WorldCom are not alone in their fraudulent endeavors, the
public attention created by the magnitude of fraud forced stricter
accounting regulations, more corporate fraud legislation, and a more
vigilant and intrusive Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 17
In August of 2001, former Vice President for Corporate
Development at Enron, Sherron Watkins, warned Enron's CEO, Ken
Lay, of impending financial problems based on "a wave of accounting
scandals."' 8 Subsequently, the company announced that it was worth
$1.2 billion less than it had reported to the SEC and its shareholders,
due to inflated estimates of income and failure to include all debts in
investor reports. 19 By the end of 2001, Enron's accounting issues
forced the company into bankruptcy, and its accountant, Arthur
Andersen, LLP, has since gone bankrupt and ceased to do business.20
As the Enron nightmare was unfolding, at MCI WorldCom,
another publicly-traded corporate behemoth, "several former
1

See Corporate Fraud on Tial: What Have We Learned?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 30, 2005), http://lmowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/

createpdf cfm?articleid=1131.
16 Id. at 1 (citing David Skeel, IcARus IN THE BOARDROOM: THE
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM

(2005)).
17See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-OxleyAct and the Making of Quack
CorporateGovernance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
1 Enron Whistleblower Tells of 'Crooked Company,' MSNBC (Mar. 15,
2006, 7:46 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11839694.
19 Enron Fraud, LAWYERSHOP.COM, http://www.lawyershop.com/practice-

areas/criminal-law/white-collar-crimes/securities-fraudlawsuitsenron (last visited
Aug. 22,2010).
20 Id.
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employees gave statements alleging instances of hiding bad debt,
understating costs, and backdating contracts." 2 1 WorldCom failed to
investigate the claims of the former employees, and as a result, its
shareholders sued.22
The lawsuit was dismissed for "lack of
evidence." 23 However, upon an investigation beginning in March
2002, the SEC found that the past employer claims were true, and "the
SEC filed a civil fraud lawsuit against WorldCom," which resulted in
several executives being found liable.24 WorldCom revealed that it had
overstated its earnings by more than $9 billion during the period
between 1999 and the first quarter of 2002, primarily by improperly
accounting for its operating costs. 25
As a result of the corporations' grave malfeasance, all publiclyregistered companies were treated as if they had Enron or WorldCom
potential. Spurred on by countless numbers of other corporate scandals
including the likes of Adelphia, Tyco, and ImClone, reform was
inevitable.26 Investor confidence in major companies and the stock
market was at an all-time low, thanks in part to these large
corporations' scams.27 Not to mention, the tragedies of 9/11 added to
the calamity and financial woes of the country as 2001 came to a
close. 28 Congress and the SEC had to efficiently and rapidly restore
integrity and honesty into the market. In the spring of 2002, the House
of Representatives passed H.R. 3763 entitled "Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002"
21

WorldCom Securities Fraud Scandal, LAWYERSHOP.COM, http://www.

lawyershop.com/practice-areas/crininal-law/white-collar-crimes/securities-fraud/
lawsuits/worldcom (last visited Aug. 22, 2010).
22
23

id
id.

24

id

First Amended Complaint, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d.
431 (2003)
(No. 02-CV-4963).
26
25

See WorldCom, supra note 21.

William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks to
the National Press Club (Jul. 30, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch073003whd.htm (noting that corporate malfeasance resulted in a
"widespread collapse of investor confidence.").
27

28

Patrick McGeehan, After the 'Darkest Year,' a Change Wall St., N.Y.

Sep. 8, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/business/after-thedarkest-year-a-changed-wall-st.html (noting that "aiming at the World Trade
Center, the terrorists struck ... a complex that not only was just a few blocks
from the stock exchange, the heart of the financial system, but also was the
communication and transportation hub connecting Wall Street to the rest of the
world" and that the attack "shut down American financial markets for several
days.").
TIMES,
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proposed by Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio)."
Oxley
introduced his bill in a much different format than that of the current
law-a much less stringent and exhaustive proposal that was only
partially comparable to current legislation.30 More specifically, the
proposal did not contain any provisions stipulating that corporate
officers sign off on all financial reports.31 The House passed the bill by
a vote of.334-90.
The House then referred the bill to the Senate
Banking Committee with the support of President Bush and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.33 On June 25, 2002, the
Chairman of that Committee, Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), proposed
his own bill, Senate Bill 2673, to the Senate Banking Committee. 34
Structurally, Sarbanes's bill shows more similarities to the current Act
establishing titles within the bill, which included Section 404 of Title
IV and Section 302 of Title 111-two of the most troublesome sections
that remain part of the current law. 35
Congress then formed a committee to reconcile the differences
between Representative Oxley's bill and Senator Sarbanes's bill. 6
While Congress evaluated the proposals, the media in the United States
swarmed around the Enron and WorldCom indictments and scandals.37
29 Corporate
and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility,
Transparency Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).

and

30 Compare Id., with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116

Stat. 745.

31H.R. 3763
32

Final Vote Results for Roll Call 110, CLERK.HOUSE.Gov (April
24,

2002), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll110.xml (counting ballots for H.R.
3763).
33 Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The
PCAOB and Its Public/PrivateStatus, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 975, 1004

(2005) ("The [House bill], with the support of President Bush and the SEC, was
then referred to the Senate Banking Committee").
34 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002, S. 2673, 107th Cong.
3 Compare Id., with H.R. 3763; see also, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §
101.
36 See Nagy, supra note 33, at 1005-06 ("After the Senate's unanimous
vote on July 15, 2002, the House and the Senate formed a Conference
Committee to reconcile the stark differences between Senator Sarbanes's bill
(S. 2673) and Representative Oxley's bill (H.R. 3763).").
3 Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Corporate Conduct: The
Overview; Fed Chief Blames CorporateGreed; House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Jul.

17, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/17/business/corporate-conduct-overview
-fed-chief-blames-corporate-greed-house-revises-bill.html ("With political pressure
growing and the stock market falling, the House hurriedly passed a measure that
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Congress, influenced by the pressure of the media and the consumers in
the midst of the corporate scandal frenzy, relied heavily on Senator
Sarbanes's bill, and the Committee finalized the conference bill on July
24, 2002, naming it "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002."" When both
houses of Congress voted on the newly revised bill, it was passed with
confidence in an overwhelming fashion: 423-3 in the House and 99-0
in the Senate.39 On July 30, 2002, President George W. Bush hurriedly
signed it into law just before the August congressional recess. 40 What
resulted is a law containing eleven titles (each divided into sections)
which vary in context from additional corporate responsibilities to
implementation of more severe criminal penalties. 4 1
Congress's approach mandated that companies adopt many
unreasonable requirements, which gave little consideration to a
company's size or financial records, into their accounting practices.4 2
would . . . curb corporate wrongdoing." Furthermore, "[Senator] Oxley said a
number of senators . . . voted for [the bill despite reservations] because 'nobody
wanted to get in front of that train."'); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Worldcom's Collapse:
Congressional Action; Little Progress On Corporate Governance Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul.
22, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-

collapse-congressional-action-little-progress-corporate-govemance.html?scp=6&
sq=sarbanes+oxley&st-nyt ("President Bush and Democratic leaders increased the
pressure on Congress to complete its work within days" on reconciling the House
and Senate versions of the future Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act.); Richard A. Oppel Jr.,
Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Negotiators Agree On Broad Changes In
Business Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/25/

business/corporate-conduct-overview-negotiators-agree-broad-changes-businesslaws.html?scp=1&sq=sarbanes+oxley&st-nyt ("The [bill] moved along quickly in
the wake of the daily disclosures of corporate scandal.").
38 Bill Summary & Status, THOMAS.LOC.Gov, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-

bin/bdquery/z?dl07:HRO3763:@@@SITOM:/bss/dlO7query.html

(last visited

Feb. 1, 2011).
3 Final Vote Results for Roll Call 348, CLERK.HOUSE.Gov (July 25,
2002), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll348.xml_(counting ballots for H.R.
3763); U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress-2ndSession, SENATE.Gov

(July

25,

2002),

http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call-lists/

roll-call votecfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00192.
40 Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs Bill
Aimed At Fraud In Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/3 1/business/corporate-conduct-the-presidentbush-signs-bill-aimed-at-fraud-in-corporations.html ("President Bush signed a

sweeping corporate-fraud bill today ....
41Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1.
42 See e.g,. Ehud Kamar et. al., Going-Private Decisions And The
Sarbanes-OxleyAct Of 2002: A Cross-CountryAnalysis, 25 J.L. EcON. & ORG.

107, 129 (2009) (finding based on empirical analysis that Sarbanes-Oxley
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SOX has also created difficulty in timing the announcement of
corporate actions, raised director exposure to litigation despite their
best attempts to get it right, and has disadvantaged American
corporations by raising compliance costs into the stratosphere. Years
later, it is apparent that Sarbanes-Oxley has created more trouble than it
has been worth.43 Conceptually, the Act's approach for reforming
corporate accounting practices is simultaneously revolutionary and
indefensible. The corporate world indisputably needed some sort of
regulatory interference. However, the substance of SOX lacks the
foresight and specificity required and has created dissatisfaction and
hurdles for corporate officials, foreign companies, and many
lawmakers that not only hinder corporate action, but also place
unnecessary financial strain upon companies. 44

"disproportionately burdens small firms"); Nathan Wilda, David Pays for
Goliath's Mistakes: The Costly Effect Sarbanes-Oxley Has on Small
Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 671, 680 (2004) (stating that "[b]ecause

the Act does not distinguish between large and small companies, the burden of
compliance is weighing very heavily on smaller firms").
43 See e.g., Romano, supra note 17, at 1524 (finding that "extensive
empirical literature suggests that [corporate governance] mandates [in SabanesOxley] were seriously misconceived, because they are not likely to improve
audit quality or otherwise enhance firm performance and thereby benefit
investors as Congress intended" and that "the mandates should be rescinded").
44 See Kenneth B. Davis Jr., The SEC and Foreign Companies - A
Balance Of Competing Interests, 71 U. PIrr. L. REv. 457, 462 (2010) (citing
that compliance with Sarbanes-Oxlcy is a "serious concern for foreign
companies" and has reportedly contributed to the "sharp downward trend in
foreign registered offerings"); Cheryl L. Wade, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And
Ethical Corporate Climates: What The Media Reports; What The General
Public Knows, 2 BROOK. J. CoRP. FIN. & COM. L. 421, 440 (2008) ("Business

leaders complain that SOX was hastily enacted and that its benefits are severely
outweighed by its costs, thereby reducing the competitiveness of U.S.
companies in the global economy."); Kara Scannell, Sarbanes Oxley Critics
Declare a Victory - At Least for Now, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Nov. 03,
2009, 11:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/1 l/03/sarbanes-oxleycritics-declare-a-victory-at-least-for-now/ (discussing lawmaker concerns with
regard to the negative impact Sarbanes-Oxley has on small, publicly-traded
companies and the need to exempt them from the Act's financial controls).
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II. SECTION 404

Section 404 is not only the crux of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 but also the root of many problems associated with the Act. 45
Section 404 requires that each publicly-held company prepare and
include reports issued by corporate managers in the company's
quarterly and yearly filings to outline the state of the company's
internal accounting controls; additionally, Section 404 requires that the
effectiveness of such internal controls be attested to by an independent
outside auditor.4 6 Section 404 imposes penalties upon both the
company and the external auditors if the auditor is not totally
independent of the company.47 This liability creates confusion, as well
as a chilling effect, between companies and auditors alike because
some communication between the two is necessary but too much is
illegal.4 8 Moreover, the company must bear the costs for the measures
to inspect their internal controls, for the outside auditor's survey of
those controls, and for the solutions to the problems detected by either
party.4 9
A. "THE CHILLING EFFECT"

Section 404 and its various interpretations have created a
"chilling effect" amongst companies, their internal audit committees,

45 See e.g., Renee M. Jones, Will the SEC Survive FinancialRegulatory
Reform?, 71 U. Prrr. L. REv. 609, 620 (2010) (calling Section 404 the "most
controversial provision" in Sarbanes-Oxley); Charles W. Murdock, SarbanesOxley Five Years Later: Hero or Villain, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 525, 550-51

(2008) (detailing some of the significant problems with section 404 and noting
that the "[compliance] cost has been so much larger than anticipated").
46 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404 ("The Commission shall prescribe
rules requiring each annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) to contain an
internal control report, which shall-{1) state the responsibility of management
for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and
procedures for financial reporting; and (2) contain an assessment, as of the end
of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal
control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting.").
47
48

See id.
Lynn Stephens & Robert G. Schwartz, The Chilling Effect of Sarbanes-

Oxley: Myth or Reality?, CPA J. (June 2006), http://www.nysscpa.org/
cpajoumal/2006/606/infocus/pl 4.htm.
49 Prentice, supra note 5, at 728-29 (discussing costs of section 404
including "internal control expenditures" and "audit fees").
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and their independent auditors.50 The "chilling effect" stems from a
disinclination of independent auditors to advise their clients on internal
control issues, and many independent auditors take the position that the
provision of any services outside of the audit could be perceived as a
violation of their independence. 5' Accountants, auditors, and corporate
officials fear risking their livelihoods by crossing the fine line that
divides a permissible amount of communication with the company and
an excessive amount, which has been deemed illegal.52 The confusion
exists because it is necessary that accountants and internal auditors
communicate and cooperate in order to produce beneficial results for
the companies and themselves, but too much communication could lead
to the imposition of fines and other penalties on the company or
accountants.53 The rules relating to auditor independence that give rise
4
to this communication breakdown are found in Title I of the Act.5
Specifically, the Act draws a line between audit services and non-audit
services, with the latter being generally prohibited if the auditor is to be
qualified an independent.55
However, the Act has many features that should be helpful in
providing fair reporting of financial results. The creation of the
federally mandated Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in
Title I should do much to clean up the cozy relationship that has existed
between some auditors and some registrants.56 In Free Enterprise Fund
v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Supreme Court
found the Act to be constitutional; nevertheless, the Court declared that
the absence of meaningful oversight by the executive branch
appointment process made exercise of the Board's authority

50 Stephens & Schwartz, supra note 48.
51 Id.
52 Id.

53 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 3.
54 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 201-09.
5s Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201 (Non-audit service is defined to
include 1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or
financial statements of the audit client; 2) financial information systems design
and implementation; 3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions; 4)
actuarial services; 5) internal audit outsourcing services; 6) management
functions or human resources; 7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or
investment banking services; 8) legal services and expert services unrelated to
the audit; and 9) any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is
impermissible.).
56 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101.
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unconstitutional. 57 Prior to the decision, Board members were only
The decision of the Court
removable for "good cause shown."5
declared the removal restriction invalid, leaving the Board members
removable "at will" going forward.59 Because there is no savings
clause in the statute, the Court's "split" decision is somewhat troubling,
as the opinion in no uncertain terms relates that, except as Board tenure
is modified, "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act remains fully operative as a
The case can be taken as a strengthening of auditor
law."60
independence. Going forward, the financial community and the public
will benefit from a higher level of confidence that reported financial
results reflect the application of an understood standard consistently
applied. This will greatly help the public and all segments of
commerce.
B. SO EXPENSIVE

The main concern with SOX for publicly-traded companies
registered in the United States is the cost of compliance, not only in
terms of what companies have to directly pay external parties but also
in terms of ancillary costs such as time.6 ' As they contend with budget
issues, smaller public companies are particularly struggling to
comply. 62 Midsize firms, which are currently spending the smallest
"

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138

(2010).
5

Id. at 3142.
Id. at 3145.

6

Id. at 3161.

61 OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Study of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 404 Internal Control over Financial
Reporting Requirements, 2 (2009) [hereinafter Study of Section 404 Internal

Control], available
404 study.pdf.

at

http://

www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-

62 U. S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-361, REPORT TO THE
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, U.S. SENATE,
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: CONSIDERATION OF KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN
ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIEs, at 5 (2006)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC
("While smaller companies historically have paid
COMPANIES]

disproportionately higher audit fees than larger companies as a percent of
revenues, the percentage difference between median audit fees paid by smaller
versus larger public companies grew in 2004, particularly for companies that
implemented the act's internal control provisions (section 404). Smaller public
companies also cited other costs of compliance with section 404 and other
provisions of the act, such as the use of resources for compliance rather than for
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percentage of their budgets on compliance, have seen their costs go
through the roof; however, these midsize firms are the most likely to
invest in financial reporting software and may be able to best control
their costs. 6 3 Large firms have also taken a hit. For example, an officer
of Pfizer reported that their measured annualized compliance costs have
increased to $125 million. 4 On any scale, this level of compliance
costs is out of hand. Regardless of the firm size, the cost of compliance
has squeezed profit margins for all, discouraging initial public offerings
and forcing smaller companies to delist, thereby decreasing the
competition on which the U.S. economy was founded and that today
65
spurs improvements in products and services for consumers.

other business activities. Moreover, the characteristics of smaller companies,
including resource and expertise limitations and lack of familiarity with formal
internal control frameworks, contributed to the difficulties and costs they
experienced in implementing the act's requirements. . . .

Smaller public

companies and accounting firms noted that the complexity of the internal
control framework and the scope and complexity of the audit standard and
related guidance for auditors on section 404 issued during rather than prior to
the initial year of implementation contributed to the costs and challenges
experienced in the first year of implementation. It is generally expected that
compliance costs for section 404 will decrease in subsequent years, given the
first-year investment in documenting internal controls. The act, along with
other market forces, appeared to have been a factor in the increase in public
companies deregistering with SEC (going private)--from 143 in 2001 to 245 in
2004. However, these companies were small by any measure (market
capitalization, revenue, or assets) and represented 2 percent of public
companies in 2004. Based on our survey responses and discussions with
smaller public companies that implemented section 404, it appears that the act
has not adversely affected the ability of those smaller public companies to raise
capital. However, it is too soon to assess fully the impact of the act on access
to capital, particularly because of the large number of smaller public
companies-the more than 5,900 small public companies considered by SEC to
be non-accelerated filers-that have been given an extension by SEC to
implement section 404.").
63 Paula L. Green, Costly Compliance, GLOBAL FIN., Apr. 2005, available
http://www.gfmag.com/archives/65-65-april-2005/1667-features-costlyat
compliance.html#axzzlMdpelIS6 ("The cost of complying with the
controversial section, which forces companies to monitor the internal controls
they have in place to ensure their financial reporting is accurate and requires
outside auditors to vouch for those controls, can tally several million dollars for
a mid-size company.").
6 Pfizer Officer, Florida Directors' Institute Program, Univ. of Tampa,
2006.
65 See Thomas Selling, Sarbanes-Oxley: Unintended Consequences,
GLOBAL

VIsTA,

THUNDERBIRD

(2004),

http://www.enewsbuilder.net/
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An analysis released by the SEC in September of 2009
discovered that "the largest cost component is internal labor costswhich can comprise more than 50 percent of the total compliance
costs."6 As may be expected, "[1]arger companies tend to incur higher
compliance costs in dollar terms ('absolute cost'), while smaller
companies report higher costs as a fraction of asset value ('scaled
67
"The Section 404(a) cost is borne through increased internal
cost')."
labor and outside vendor expenses, while the Section 404(b) cost is
experienced primarily through increased independent-auditor fees. . .
. ,8
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
which undertook a study to analyze the costs for public companies to
comply with SOX, "In 2002, 64 companies that went private cited cost
as one of the reasons for the decision; however, that number increased
69
Of the
to 143 and 130 companies in 2003 and 2004, respectively."

thunderbird/e articleOO0246430.cfm; see also, Matt Quinn, Sarbanes-Oxley
Has Some Publics Thinking Private, INC.COM (May 20, 2004),
(citing a survey
http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200405/sarbanes.html
published by Chicago law firm of Foley and Lardner, LLP, which found that of
115 companies surveyed, most of which consisted of small to mid-size firms,
there was a 50% increase in respondents contemplating delisting as a result of
the Act from 2002 to 2003).
66 Study of Section 404 Internal Control, supra note 61, at 5.
6
1 d. at 2.
6
1 d. at 2.
69 SENATE REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES,

supra note 62, at 23. In this report, GAO (1) analyzes the impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on smaller public companies, particularly in terms of
compliance costs; (2) describes responses of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) to concerns raised by smaller public companies; and (3) analyzes
smaller public companies' access to auditing services and the extent to which
the share of public companies audited by mid-sized and small accounting firms
has changed since the act was passed. To address these objectives, Dr. Liz
Arnold, a colleague of Professor Freer at The Citadel, reviewed information
from a variety of sources, including the legislative history of the Act, relevant
regulatory pronouncements and public comments, research studies and papers,
and other stakeholders (such as trade groups and market participants). To
analyze the impact of the Act on smaller public companies, in connection with
her Ph.D. thesis at Rutgers University, she obtained data from SEC filings
provided through a licensing agreement with Audit Analytics, and analyzed
data elements including auditing fees and auditor changes to determine costs of
compliance. Similarly, she constructed a database of public companies that
went private using SEC filings and press releases retrieved from Lexis-Nexis,
an online periodical database. To obtain information on smaller public
companies' experiences with Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance, Dr. Arnold also
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companies that cited cost as a reason for going private, "roughly 58
percent in 2004 and 2005 and 41 percent in 2003 .

.

. mentioned the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically."70 Companies, large and small, are
required to bear the burden of financing the implementation of SOX by
paying for external auditors and accountants to attest that the
SOX has
companies' internal accounts are effective and efficient.
proved onerous for small companies by forcing them from public
ownership.72 Average compliance costs increased from and average of
conducted a survey of companies with market capitalization of $700 million or
less and annual revenues of $100 million or less that, as of August 11, 2005,
reported to SEC that they had complied with the Act's internal control-related
requirements. One hundred fifty-eight of 591 companies completed the survey,
for an overall response rate of 27%. Additionally, she held discussions with
representatives of SEC, the Small Business Administration (SBA), PCAOB,
smaller public companies, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO), financial service providers, rating agencies,
institutional investors, trade groups, accounting firms, and other market
participants. Because the SEC has extended the date by which registered
public companies with less than $75 million in public float (known as nonaccelerated filers) had to comply with the Act's internal control-related
provisions (Section 404) to their first fiscal year ending on or after July 15,
2007, Dr. Arnold could not analyze the impact of the internal control provisions
of the act for a significant number of smaller public companies (SEC estimates
that non-accelerated filers represent about 60% of all registered public
companies). Thus, to gain some insight into the potential impact these
provisions may have on smaller public companies, Dr. Arnold analyzed public
data and other information related to the experiences of public companies that
have fully implemented the Act's provisions. To determine the Act's impact
on smaller privately held companies, Dr. Arnold interviewed officials about
state requirements comparable to key Sarbanes-Oxley provisions and
representatives of smaller private companies and financial institutions about
capital access requirements. Dr. Arnold also analyzed data on companies'
initial public offering (IPO) and secondary public offering (SPO) from SEC
filings. To assess changes in the domestic public company audit market, Dr.
Arnold used public data-for 2002 and 2004-on public companies and their
external accounting firms to determine how the number and mix of domestic
public company audit clients had changed for firms other than the large
accounting firms.
70 id.

71Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404.
72 See e.g., D. Skylar Rosenbloom, Take It Slow: A Novel Concept In The
Life Of Sarbanes-Oxley, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1185, 1201 (2006) (noting
that "[a]dvocates for small business believe these increased costs are the
impetus behind the increase in companies opting to delist their shares instead of
accepting the burdens and costs of Sarbanes-Oxley"); Kamar et. al., supra note
42, at 107 (2009) (finding based on empirical evidence that "SOX induced
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$1.2 million when SOX was enacted to an average of $2.8 million in
2005, an increase of 130%."
Some relief was recently granted to certain small companies,
74
specifically those not defined as large accelerated filers or larger filers
under Rule 12b-2, by H.R. 4173, also known as the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)." The
Dodd-Frank Act amended SOX such that public companies with less
than $75 million public float are exempted from the provisions of
404(b) that require an external audit of internal control. 76 The DoddFrank Act left unchanged the compliance requirements of 404(a)
Similarly, the
relating to management's report on internal control.
requirement that all public companies, no matter the size, submit to an
external audit of their financial statements remains intact.78 In a slight
of hand and an acknowledgement of trend, subsection (b) of 989G
called for a study of the possible benefits of extending the exemption of
989G(a) to public companies with floats between $75 million and $250
million, and whether or not such reductions in compliance costs would

small firms to exit the public capital market during the year following its
enactment").
7 John Gibeaut, Small Companies Eye Going Private To Avoid SarbanesOxley, Bowne SecuritiesConnect, http://www.bowne.com/securitiesconnect/
details.asp?storylD= 1073 (abstracted from ABA Journal, Jan. 2005, 20-21).
Gibeaut also notes that this figure is particularly troubling because it does not
reflect the cost of compliance with Section 404, which was phased in for small
filers in July of 2005.
74 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2009). ("(1) Accelerated filer. The term
accelerated filer means an issuer after it first meets the following conditions as
of the end of its fiscal year: (i) The issuer had an aggregate worldwide market
value of the voting and non-voting common equity held by its non-affiliates of
$75 million or more, but less than $700 million, as of the last business day of
the issuer's most recently completed second fiscal quarter; (ii) The issuer has
been subject to the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Act (15 U.S.C.
78m or 78o(d)) for a period of at least twelve calendar months; (iii) The issuer
has filed at least one annual report pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Act;
and (iv) The issuer is not eligible to use Forms 10KSB and 1OQSB (249.310b
and 249.308b of this chapter) for its annual and quarterly reports. (2) Large
accelerated filer. The term large accelerated filer means an issuer after it first
meets the following conditions as of the end of its fiscal year: (i) The is
7 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 989G, 103 Stat. 440 (2009).
16 See id.
7 See id
7 See id.
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encourage companies to list on U.S. exchanges in their initial public
offerings. 79
Lawmakers drafted and passed SOX with expectations that initial
costs would decrease after several years. However, the costs continue
to remain higher than anticipated, reaping fear in some companies that
causes them to stay private or even delist.8 0 "[T]he number of public
companies that went private has increased significantly from 143 in
2001 to 245 in 2004, with the greatest increase occurring during
2003."81 Based on a Foley & Lardner study, SOX caused the average
cost of being public in fiscal year 2006 for a company with annual
revenue under $1 billion to increase 171% from fiscal year 2001.82 The
average cost of being a public company with annual revenue over $1
The most
billion increased 54% from fiscal years 2001 to 2006.
drastic cost increases for all public companies were found in the fees
paid to auditors.84 Those companies found on the S&P Small-Cap had
audit costs increase 311% from fiscal years 2001 to 2006, while
companies on the S&P Mid-Cap and S&P 500 saw audit costs increase
251% and 189%, respectively, in that same time frame.s
In November 2004, the GAO study determined that costs for
smaller companies were disproportionately higher due to the
requirement that companies file reports on the strength of their internal
financial controls and fix any problems that were found. 6 Total costs
of compliance had jumped 90% by 2003.87 According to one study
performed by Charles River Associates that surveyed ninety companies
from the Fortune 1000, costs associated with Section 404 compliance in

7 See id
80 Anti-Fraud Laws Cost More Than Expected, MSNBC.COM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12691559/ (last updated 5/8/2006 8:54:02 PM).
81 SENATE REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC
COMPANIES,
supra note 62, at 21.
82 Foley & Lardner LLP, The Cost ofBeing Public in the Era ofSarbaneshttp://www.foley.com/files/
2,
2007),
(Aug.
15-16
Oxley, FOLEY,
tbl s3lPublications/FileUploadl37/3736/Foley2007SOXStudy.pdf.
83 id.

'Id. at 6-9.

s Id. at 1, fig. 1.

86 SENATE REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC
COMPANIES,

supra note 62, at 5.
87 Bloomberg, Sarbanes-Oxley Law Raises Audit, Legal, Board Costs
(Update

1),

BLOOMBERG

(May

5,

2003),

http://www.bloomberg.com/

apps/news?pid=7 1000001 &refer-&sid=azllqgt9rNGM.
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2004 were approximately $7.8 million.
The report also stated that
compliance costs with Section 404 represented about 0.1% of total
Financial Executives
company revenue for these companies.8 9
International (FEI) conducted a survey in March of 2005, consisting of
217 companies, and found that each company spent an average of $4.36
million in added internal control, auditor, and consultant costs during
the first year of compliance with Section 404.90 FEI also found that
companies with revenues over $25 billion spent, on average, $14.7
million in compliance, auditor, and consultant costs.91 "Another survey
of corporate board members conducted by executive-search firm
Korn/Ferry International estimate[d] that complying would cost the
U.S. companies surveyed an average of $5.1 million."92 "More than
half the companies surveyed by [FEI] . . . agree[d] Section 404 has
given investors more faith in their financial statements . . . [b]ut 94%

While
said the new rules have cost more than they are worth." 93
some costs associated with Section 404 compliance have declined due
to increased efficiency in the number of internal and external staff
hours needed for compliance, other costs have increased.94 Auditing

88 Charles River Associates, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Costs and
Remediation of Deficiencies: Estimates from a Sample of Fortune 1000
Companies (Apr. 2005), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/soxcomp/soxcomp-allattach.pdf.
89 Id.

90 Scott Sunshine & Chris Allen, Financial Executives International,
Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Costs Exceed Estimates, PRNEWSWIRE (Mar. 21,
2005), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sarbanes-oxley-compliancecosts-exceed-estimates-54305407.html.
9' Id.
92 Beth

BUSINESSWEEK

Carney, Foreign Outfits Rue Sarbanes-Oxley, BLOOMBERG
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
(Dec. 15, 2004),

dnflash/dec2004/nf20041215_9306_db016.htm; see also Press Release,
Korn/Ferry International, Price of Regulatory Compliance Skyrockets,
According to Board Directors Worldwide (Nov. 22, 2004),
http://www.kornferry.com/PressRelease/840.

9
'Barbara Hagenbaugh & Matt Krantz, New Accounting Rules Raise Price of
Audits, USA TODAY: MONEY (Apr. 12, 2005 10:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
moneZy/companiesregulation/2005-04-12-audits x.htm.
4 Financial Executives International, FEI Survey: Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance
Costs are Dropping; Average Compliance Costs are $3.8 Million, Down 16%from
PriorYear; Reductions About Half of What Were Anticipated,PRNEwswRE (Apr. 6,
2006) [hereinafter FEl Survey], http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT
=104&STORY=/www/story/04-06-2006/0004335523&EDATE= ("FEl polled 274
public companies, of which 238 are 'accelerated filers' according to SEC definitions
and have average revenues of $6 billion, to gauge experiences in complying with
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and accounting firms have increased their fees as more work and time
are demanded of them due to responsibility imposed as a result of
SOX. 95 A Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI member survey indicated that
"[b]efore SOX was enacted, the SEC estimated compliance costs at
around $91,000 per company . . . but average costs [in 2005] for 40
MAPI companies was $1.613 million for external audit fees for Section
404 compliance, plus $1.894 million for internal work for
from
of data
analysis
Today
compliance." 96 "A USA
AuditAnalytics.com show(ed] audit and related fees . .. jumped 40% to
$3.5 billion among Standard & Poor's 500 companies [in 2004] . . . on

top of a 17% increase in fees they had to absorb in 2003."
"According to a study by ... law firm Foley & Lardner LLP of 708
large and small companies, average audit fees for 2004 were up 61
percent over 2003 . . . [and] for Standard & Poor's 500 companies, the

average tab was $7.4 million in audit fees in 2004, up from $4.8 million
a year earlier." 98
Monetary costs have not only increased because of many direct
sources such as external auditors, accountants, and lawyers, but they
have also increased also because of time, which could be more
beneficially spent on other matters instead of complying with SOX
regulations. Each company must take time to ensure that all internal
controls fall within regulations and that all employees comply with the
stricter internal regulations. In the first year that SOX was fully
instituted, Alliance companies, from the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI
survey, "devoted an average of 38,252 hours to Section 404
implementation." 99 Similarly, the FEI survey presented the statistic
that businesses with over $5 billion in revenues measured an average of
Sarbanes-Oxley's Section 404. This is the fourth SOX compliance survey FEl has
conducted since 2004.").
95 See Colleen Cunningham, Weighing the Worth of an External Audit,
COMPLIANCE WK. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/article/

5904; FEl Survey, supra note 94.
96 Thomas J. Duesterberg, Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley, WASH. TIMES (May

23, 2006, 10:53 PM), http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20060523105305-8693r.htm.
9 Hagenbaugh & Krantz, supra note 93.
98 Leon Lazaroff, Debate Rages on Costs, Value of Sarbanes-Oxley, CH.
TRiB. (Apr. 23, 2006), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/yourmoncy/

sns-yourmoney-0423watch, 1,6402236.story?coll=chi-navrailbusiness-nav.
99 Duesterberg, supra note 96; see also Donald A. Norman, The Cost of
SOX and the Compliance Process: Year Two, Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI,
2006,

at

8,

available

51 1/tjduesterberg9949.pdf.

at

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/4-
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00
35,000 hours each in 2004 to comply with the new regulations.'
Consequently, the large amount of hours relinquished by companies to
0
Costs associated
maintain compliance has decreased productivity.'
with lost productivity increased by nearly $900,000 in 2004 for
respondents with annual revenue under $1 billion and approximately
$4,235,000 in 2004 for respondents with annual revenue of $1 billion
and over.' 02

C. FROM THE OUTSIDE
SOX Section 404 implemented many expensive encumbrances
that foreign companies do not want to tolerate. Foreign companies that

were once traded in the United States or that were looking forward to
opening to the U.S. markets no longer want to be placed under the
microscope of the SEC.io3 In a report issued by the SEC in September
of 2009, of all foreign firms responding, 26.1% reported that Section
404 had "very seriously" motivated considerations of delisting, and
25.5% reported that 404 "somewhat" motivated such considerations. 0
As a result, fewer foreign companies have listed within the United
States to avoid the high costs associated with SOX compliance.'s
"Financial-management consultancy Parson Consulting estimate[d] that
complying with Sarbanes-Oxley would cost the 70 Britishheadquartered businesses included in their survey a total of $860
million."' 0 6
listings:

Thomas Selling's article described the impact on new

New listings by foreign companies in United States
markets have dropped sharply since the passage in
2002 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. And among foreign

1n Hagenbaugh & Krantz, supra note 93; Stuart Michelson & Jud
Stryker, A Comprehensive Survey of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 8 (Stetson Univ. Sch. of Bus. Admin. Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 80308, 2008), available at http://www.stetson.edu/business/fdc/
media/Papers/SOXResearchPaperMichelsonStryker.pdf; Financial Executives
International, Special Survey on Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Implementation
Executive Summary (July 2004), available at http://www.deloitte.com/
2 4 4 2
assets/Dcom-Australia/Local%20Assets/Documents/FEI%20SOX% 0 0 % 0
4
Executive%20Summary.pdf.
%20-%20
Survey%20August%20200
101See Hagenbaugh & Krantz, supra note 93.
102 Foley & Lardner, supra note 82, at 15-16.
103 See Selling, supra note 65.
10 Study ofSection 404 InternalControl, supra note 61, at 67, fig. 3.
105 Study ofSection 404 InternalControl, supra note 61, at 67.
106 Carney, supra note 92.
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companies already listed on United States markets,
many would like to escape the burdens imposed by
the act's requirements, which have roughly doubled
the cost of a U.S. listing.'0 7
These foreign companies are choosing to expand to other
markets, specifically European markets. "The real problem for the U.S.
economy is not just the number of companies delisting, but 'the
companies that would have listed, but now won't. Across the board,
people are reconsidering."' 0 8 Money that was once generated or could
be potentially generated in the United States under either the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the National Associated Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) is now moving overseas, creating
an adverse effect for which SOX is to blame.
Going forward, the companies that leave or fail to register within
the United States are opting for markets where they face less regulation
and lower costs. In 2000, "nine out of every 10 dollars raised by
foreign companies through new stock offerings were done in New York
rather than London or Luxembourg.

. .

. But by 2005, the reverse was

true: Nine of every 10 dollars were raised through new company
listings in London or Luxembourg. . . ."109 Although the United States
market is attractive for growth, the costs and burdens of SOX
compliance outweigh the potential long-term benefit, and the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) is an attractive alternative. The LSE is now one
of the most popular havens for SOX escapees. Thomas J. Duesterberg,
in his article Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley, compared the LSE to U.S.

markets:
In 2005, the London Stock Exchange saw 129 new
listings, while the New York Stock Exchange gained
only 6 net new listings and the NASDAQ only 14.
Not one of the 10 largest new global listings was
registered in the United States, and 22 of the top 25
were registered outside the U.S. . . .

107
108

Of those

Selling, supra note 65.
SarbOx Has Foreign Companies Decamping, supra note 14 (quoting

Rhian Chilcott, head of the Washington, D.C. office of the Confederation of
British Industry).
109 Tom Feeney, COMPETE Act Reduces SOX's Costs, SMALL Bus. &
ENTREPRENEURSHIP COUNCIL (May 26, 2006), http://www.sbecouncil.org/news/

display.cfm?ID=1670 (quoting Craig Karmin & Aaron Lucchetti, New York
Loses Edge in Snagging Foreign Listings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2006, at CI);
see also Duesterberg,supra note 96.
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choosing new issues in London, 38 percent
considered the United States, but 90 percent of those
cited the onerous demands of SOX as tipping the
balance in favor of London. 0
"In 2000, foreign companies raised $16.9 billion in new listings in New
York and London, with the U.S. claiming 89% of that total.

. .

. [In

2005], London grabbed 88% of that business."'
Russian companies provide another example of foreign
companies choosing SEC alternatives. Russia has been recovering
from its socialistic past with fervor, and its companies have been
looking to expand into the world market, but not the U.S. markets.
Russian companies registered on the LSE in droves in 2005.112
According to the LSE's head of international business development,
Tracy Pierce, "the [LSE] is in discussions with a number of companies
from China and Russia seeking refuge from U.S. regulation."" 3
The United States has recognized the reluctance of foreign
companies to register because of SOX, and the SEC is maneuvering to
regain and maintain the absconded companies.11 4 In September 2005,
the European Union and SEC worked out a proposal to "eliminate the
requirement that European companies using International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) reconcile their financial reports to United
States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP).""
Despite this agreement, many foreign companies have shown no signs

110 Duesterberg, supra note 96.
" Elfenbein, Posting WS: Foreign Firms Bailing Out, CROSSING WALL

(Dec. 23, 2005, 6:08 AM), http://www.crossingwallstreet.coml/archives/
2005/12/wsj-foreign-firms-bailing-out.html; see also Karmin & Lucchetti,
supra note 109.
112 Conal Walsh, Fear of the FTSE foreigners, GUARDIAN.CO.UK: THE
(Jan. 22, 2006), http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/
OBSERVER,
story/0,, 1691868,00.html.
ST.

Carney, supranote 92.
114 JO Lynne Koehn & Stephen C. DelVecchio, Revisiting the Ripple
113

Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPA J., (May 2006), http://www.nysscpa.org/

cpajournal/2006/506/essentials/p32.htm.
" Id.; see also, KPMG LLP, SEC Proposes to Eliminate US. GAAP
Reconciliations by IFRS Filers, DEFINING ISSUES, No. 07-19 (June 2007),

http://www.kpmg.com.cn/en/virtuallibrary/Audit/defining issues/Defining
Issues0719.pdf.
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of returning to United States markets and bearing the costs associated

with SOX.

16

Compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has also
indirectly impeded the harmonizing of accounting standards between
the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the
International
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
standards are principle-based and U.S. standards are more rulebased. 117 Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the FASB and IASB were working
toward harmonizing accounting standards so that companies would
only have to prepare financial statements under one set of standards.
Until September 2005, overseas companies complying with IASB
standards had to restate or reconcile financial statements to U.S. GAAP
The procedure that the group worked out
for filing with the SEC.
leaves potential inconsistencies for the plaintiffs Bar to exploit in the
future. Perhaps in response, European regulators have expressed an
interest in requiring American companies trading in Europe to restate
or reconcile to IASB standards.' 19
Principle-based accounting does have rule frameworks, and they
are general enough to allow the judgment of the preparers to determine
how a transaction at hand should be represented in the financial
records.120 However, there is concern about how these "judgments"
would hold up under Sarbanes-Oxley. 12 That was the biggest concern
posed by the 10% of CFOs who opposed principle-based accounting,
according to a CFO magazine survey.1 22 The larger issue now in
harmonizing U.S. and International accounting is harmonizing the
23
IASB standards to Sarbanes-Oxley.1
D. THE PRUDENT MAN
An equally abhorrent consequence of SOX that has reared its
head is the evisceration of the age-old Prudent Man Rule.'2 4 The
116 Eve Novakova-Cornejo, HarmonizationofAccounting Standards,FREE

ENTERPRISE FOUND. NEWS, Summer 2005, at 3-5.

117 See id at 5; see also Koehn & DelVecchio, supra note 114.

118 Novakova-Cornejo, supra note 116, at 3.
119 See id.
120 Alix Stuart, Standing on Principles, CFO MAG., Sept. 2006, at
45-50,

available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfi/7852613/1/c_7850066.
121 id

122 id

123 Novakova-Comejo, supra note 116.
124 See Whalen, supra note 7.
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Prudent Man Rule has been the sum of essential director responsibility
and limit of liability for almost 200 years.125 "In 1830, Judge Samuel
Putnam set down a general canon for corporate behavior: 'Those with
responsibility to invest money for others should act with prudence,
discretion, intelligence, and regard for the safety of capital as well as
income."'l 26 Title III and IV of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
greatly damaged that normality and with it the bedrock of director
responsibility.
In the post-SOX world, those with responsibility to invest money
for others cannot act according to the Rule with confidence; these
officers and directors are now forced to primarily consider the rules and
regulations of SOX, instead of making the appropriate or most
auspicious business decision.127 These directors and officers must
make decisions to protect themselves and their companies not only
from the omnipresent SEC but also from the potential for crippling
litigation by aggressive plaintiffs counsel intent on scoring big
recoveries.1 28 Neither of whom appear to have more than the barest
regard for existing investors.129 Through SOX regulations, a plaintiffs
counsel can depict corporate decisions, which were previously
protected and reserved for the corporate board, as ill-considered or
worse, allegedly decided based upon a desire to bolster or forestall an
impact on the public share price of corporate securities, and thus,
actionable. At the very least, the temptation for such litigation
previously forestalled by acceptance of the Prudent Man Rule will be
harmful not only in its costs both in dollars and the distraction of key
corporate officers but also harmful, even if unwarranted, to share price.

125See id. at 41 ("The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation sweeps away decades of
jurisprudence based on Delaware law and standards for corporate responsibility
such as the Prudent Man rule. In 1830, Judge Samuel Putnam set down a
general canon for corporate behavior: "Those with responsibility to invest
money for others should act with prudence, discretion, intelligence, and regard
for the safety of capital as well as income." Sarbanes-Oxley replaces the
Prudent Man rule with strictures that violate our Constitutional freedoms and
do little to actually prevent future scandals. One thing is not in doubt:
Sarbanes-Oxley makes the job of running a company more difficult and much
more expensive.").
126 -d
127 Peter J. Wallison, Blame Sarbanes-Oxley, AM. ENTERPRISE
INST. FOR
PUB. POL'Y REs. (Sept. 1, 2003), http://www.aei.org/publications/
pub1D. 19123/pubdetail.asp.
128 See Whalen, supra note 7,
at 41.
129 See Wallison, supra note
127.
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Furthermore, it is also falsely suggestive that share price manipulation
is a common practice.
Also, lawyers, accountants, and others who once enjoyed a
privileged and confidential relationship with officers of a corporation,
now have a duty to report any malfeasance they detect within the
corporation to protect themselves from the even stricter criminal
penalties.1 30 Lawyers and accountants are now police used to enforce
corporate laws and regulations, instead of serving the corporations in
their normal capacity. 131

III. SECTIONS 302 AND 906
SOX has also crippled corporate creativity and expansion
through Sections 302 and 906, which create provisions that hold chief
executive officers and chief financial officers personally liable and
impose strict penalties.1 32 Section 302 requires that corporate officers
sign off on all financial reports and that they maintain proper financial
controls.' 33 Failure to do so gives rise to civil liability and criminal
liability as set forth in Section 906, which imposes up to $1 million in
fines and/or up to ten years imprisonment. 134
The increased
punishments have consequently made management reluctant "to take
the risks and make the investments that had previously brought the
economy roaring back from periods of stagnation or recession."' 35
Sections 302 and 906, on corporate liability, instill consumer
confidence at the expense of corporate officers and directors, which
may lead to more conservative business decisions,136 therefore,
hindering companies from developing and implementing productive
strategies within local and global markets. Corporate officers are less
likely to take risk, putting them at a disadvantage compared to
companies without restraints or consequences for aggressive business
strategy.'37 They have to devote much more time to defensive actions
rather than offensive actions. 138
130 See Whalen, supra note 7, at 41.
131 id.

132 Hagenbaugh & Krantz, supra note 93.

1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302.
134 § 906.
135 Wallison, supra note 127.
136 See id.
137 Debra D'agostino, A Rock and a Hard Place; Sarbanes-Oxley
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IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Members of Congress recognized the problems associated with
the hastily written Sarbanes-Oxley Act and are attempting to amend the
Act or completely repeal the Act. Several proposals in Congress are
aimed at diminishing the burdens associated with SOX:
Republican Representative Tom Feeney of Florida and
Republican Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina proposed the
Competitive and Open Markets that Protect and Enhance the Treatment
of Entrepreneurs Act (COMPETE Act) to their respective houses in
Congress.' 39 The COMPETE Act, if passed, would have reduced the
burdens of the implementation of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 by granting exemptions to smaller companies with a
market value of less than $700 million or annual revenue of less that
$125 million and fewer than 1,500 shareholders.14 0 This Act aimed to
create incentives for registered small businesses, which could not
afford to stay public because of the burdens of Section 404.141
Although the COMPETE Act died in Congress, some of the
concessions granted to smaller companies under Section 989(G) of the
Dodd-Frank Act are similar in spirit.' 42
Congressman Ron Paul (Texas-R) proposed his own bill to the
House of Representatives, the Due Process and Economic
Competitiveness Restoration Act (the Paul Act), which would have
repealed Section 404 entirely.14 3 The Paul Act was written with the
intent to ensure financial regulations do not harm economic
competitiveness, nor deprive Americans of due process of law. The
Paul Act aimed to accomplish these goals by repealing SOX provisions
that hold corporate chief executive officers criminally liable for the
content and quality of their companies' financial reports, even when the

Help?, ALL Bus. (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/antitrust-

trade-law-sarbanes-oxley-act/13437920-1.html.
13s

id.

Competitive and Open Markets that Protect and Enhance the Treatment
of Entrepreneurs Act, S. 2824, 109th Cong. (2006).
139
1

4Id.

id
Compare S. 2824, with H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 989G (2009).
143 Due Process and Economic Competitiveness Restoration Act, H.R.
1657, 109th Cong. (2005).
141

142
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chief executive officers had no intention to engage in criminal behavior
and took reasonable steps to assure the accuracy of the statements.
Congressman Jeff Flake (Arizona-R) also proposed his bill, the
Competitiveness Enhancement Opportunity Act of 2005, to the House
of Representatives in April of 2005.145 This bill would have made
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 voluntary.146 In 2007,
two important reforms were made: the issuance of Management
Guidance, and an order approving the Public Company Accounting
47
Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Auditing Standard Number Five (AS5).1
These reforms were implemented with the goal of reducing compliance
costs, the former through better understanding, and the latter through
direct reduction in the time it takes to complete independent audits,
presumably reducing audit fees.148 The SEC relates that the reforms
have in fact reduced compliance costs, although there may be an
argument that companies with Section 404 exposure are becoming
more efficient in their compliance procedures with the passage of
time.149 Whatever the basis, the study shows a reduction in mean
compliance costs from "$2.87 million pre-reform to $2.33 million postreform."150 This represents a 19% reduction in total compliance costs
5
since the 2007 reforms.' '
According to Robert Freer, in his article published in the
Charleston Mercury, the SOX Act still requires further amendment:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, although wellintentioned, seems to have been geared more toward
public opinion than public company accountability.
Lawmakers were under pressure to take action in the
wake of million-dollar accounting scandals that
shook the confidence of the American public.
Legislators took it upon themselves to take punitive
measures against an entire industry, and in their haste
to please the public, drafted and passed legislation

'" Id
14S Competitiveness Enhancement and Opportunity Act of 2005, H.R.

1641, 109th Cong. (2005).
146 Id

147 See Study of Section 404 Internal Control, supra note 61, at
98,
Appendix A.
148 See id. at 72.
49 See id at 94-95.
0

Id. at 4-5.

''Id

at 5.
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that now victimizes that same public with its cost for
compliance. A seriously thought-out amendment
rolling back Titles III and IV would be helpful to
restoring some balance to its effect. Much of the
enhanced reporting would still occur but the heavy
emphasis on Board potential culpability for even an
innocent error would be left for civil liability
tribunals not the criminal courts. For that corporate
manager truly culpable, previously existing remedies
are already available and effective. 152
V. SOLUTIONS

No law is perfect, but the burdens of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
have proven to outweigh the potential benefits. Further reform is
needed to revise the Act to stimulate entrepreneurship, economic
growth, and creativity within companies who choose to list on the
United States markets. Regulations are always unattractive, but when
those regulations that are intended to benefit an entity and its investors
injure the entity and its investors, they must be reformed. Section 404
has caused too many problems for many public companies. External
audits have exhausted many companies' income and time. The extreme
costs and time that businesses have lost due to compliance was not the
goal of the legislation when enacted.
When given the opportunity to suggest how the
implementation of Section 404 could be made more
efficient or effective, companies identified the
following top recommendations: Reduce the degree
of documentation (67%); [p]ermit greater reliance on
internal audit data and resources (66%); [c]larify the
definition of 'key controls' (55%); [p]ermit rollforward procedures (58%); [and, a]llow cumulative
reliance on year-one testing and documentation
(53%).

153

In order to reassert the entrepreneurial strategy that is innately
required of companies desiring to compete in the present world market,
Sections 302 and 906 must be eliminated. Highly qualified individuals
152 Robert E. Freer, Jr., The Law of Unintended Consequences-Thy Name
is Sarbanes Oxley, FREE ENTERPRISE FOUND. (2007), http://www.free-

enterprise-foundation.org/sarbanes-oxley.html.
15FEI Survey, supra note 94.
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should not have to look over their shoulders at every turn fearing
reprimand. Liability should only be imposed upon corporate officers
when evidence exists of intentional misrepresentation. By allowing
this small space for unintentional errors, corporate officers are likely to
regain the confidence to take necessary risks in order to grow and
attract consumers. Regulations are welcome, but regulations that
restrict the freedom of the United States markets should be reformed to
promote the best business practices free from unnecessary limitations.

